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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH,
Supreme Court No. 20051070

Plaintiff Appellant,
vs

Court of Appeals No. 20040421

Bernadette Duran ,
Criminal

No.

031700152

Defendant Appellee,

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
FROM THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Whether the faint odor of burning marijuana indicates an
exigent circumstance permitting a warrantless search of a
residence.
OPINION BELOW
State

v.

Duran,

2005 UT App 409,

JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT
On September 29, 2005, the Court of Appeals filed its
decision in State

v. Duran,

2005 UT App 409.

On October 24, 2005, the Utah Supreme Court ordered that the
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time for the State to file a petition for certiorari be extended
to November 30, 2005.
Pursuant to Rule 45 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, on February 8, 2006, the Utah Supreme Court granted
the State's Petition for Certiorari and directed that a Briefing
Schedule be established.
Sections 78-2-2(3)(a) and (5) of the Utah Code Annotated,
give this Court jurisdiction over these matters.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
1. Fourth amendment of the United States Constitution.
Amendment IV.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
U.S. Constitution. Amend. IV.
2. Article I section 14 of the Utah Constitution.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall
issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or
affirmation, particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the person or thing to be seized.
UT. Const, art. I § 14.
3. Rule 49 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
(4) The questions presented for review, expressed in the
terms and circumstances of the case but without
unnecessary detail.
The statement of the questions
should be short and concise and should not be
Page 2 of
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argumentative or repetitious. General conclusions, such
as "the decision of the Court of Appeals is not supported
by the law or facts," are not acceptable. The statement
of a question presented will be deemed to comprise every
subsidiary question fairly included therein. Only the
questions set forth in the petition or fairly included
therein will be considered by the Supreme Court.
UT. R. App. Proc. (West 2006).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case:
On February 8, 2006, this Court granted the State's petition
for certiorari to review the Utah Court of Appeals' decision
below.

This is Defendant's brief in opposition to the State's

brief on writ of certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals.
Course of Proceedings:
On May 3, 2004, the Trial Court entered its Ruling
Motions

to Suppress,

on

denying Defendant's motion to suppress

evidence obtained through a warrantless entry and search of a
friend's residence. R. 34.

On September 29, 2005, the Utah Court

of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision.
2005 UT App 409.

State

v.

Duran,

On February 8, 2006, the Utah Supreme Court

granted the State's Petition for certiorari on one specific
issue; "Whether the detectable odor of burning marijuana
indicates an exigent circumstance permitting a warrantless search
of a residence." Order of the Utah Supreme Court granting Cert.
On March 31, 2006 the State filed its brief in support of its
petition for certiorari.
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Disposition:
The Trial Court ruled that a landlord's consent to search
the property of a tenant was valid as it was viewed through the
eyes of the police officers. R. 34:2.

The Trial Court did not

consider whether exigent circumstances justified the warrantless
entry. R. 34:3.

The State conceded that the Defendant had

standing to contest the warrantless entry. R. 34:2.
Ms. Duran was sentenced by Judge Bryce K. Bryner of the
Seventh District Court in and for Carbon County Utah, pursuant to
her conditional plea to serve a term of one to fifteen years in
the Utah State Prison on Count I and six months in the Carbon
County Jail on Count II, to be served concurrently with any other
convictions Ms. Duran was serving. R. 55.
The Utah Court of Appeals reversed the Trial Court's ruling,
holding that,
[A] s in South,
the warrantless search of Horvath's
trailer was not justified by the odor of burnt marijuana
detected by the officers when they approached the
trailer.
Although the smell of burning
marijuana
provided the officers probable cause that a crime was
being committed, it did not create exigent circumstances
that would permit a warrantless entry.
State
v. Duran, 2005 Ut App. 409, P22, (Utah Ct. App.
2005),emphasis

added.

Statement of Facts:
On April 22, 2003, Eddie Horvath and his mother, Mrs.
Horvath, contacted the Carbon County Drug Task Force. R. 60:16-7.
Eddie Horvath informed the Task Force that he had witnessed what
Page 4 of
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he believed was marijuana being smoked in Lance Horvath's trailer
residence. R. 60:17.

Eddie Horvath asked the Task Force to be

careful because he believed there were guns in the trailer.

Id.

The Police officers arrived at the trailer residence
approximately 41 minutes after receiving this information.
R.60:17-8.

There is no evidence on record that the officers did

anything more to corroborate the allegation that marijuana was
still in the process of being destroyed.
The officers did not ask whether Mrs. Horvath could enter or
access the trailer at her will.

They did not ask how frequently

she visited or stayed in the residence.
Lance had signed a rental agreement.

They did not ask if

The officers did not ask if

she had any common authority in the trailer home. R. 60:18, 46.
Instead they were simply told by Eddie and Mrs. Horvath that
Lance Horvath was not in his residence. R. 60:19.
Sargent Barnes testified that after discussing the issue,
the officers came to the conclusion that nobody in the trailer
would have standing to contest a warrantless search.

Id.

Furthermore, he testified that he preferred warrantless searches
because obtaining a warrant was too much work. R. 60:94.

He

testified that the only probable cause that the Drug Task force
had to search the home was that they believed there were drugs
being presently smoked in the home. R.60:36.
As the officers approached Mr. Horvath's trailer-home they
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described what they were only able to identify as a faint smell
of burnt marijuana emanating from the trailer. R. 60:19, 43.
Without a warrant or consent, the officers entered and searched
the trailer.

They seized numerous drugs, drug related items and

several weapons. R. 60:29,30,44.

They detained and arrested the

Defendant, Bernadette Duran, and two other occupants. R. 60:22-5.
The record does not indicate that the officers found anyone in
the trailer who was in the process of "smokin' up the evidence."
At a minimum, 41 minutes elapsed between the time officers
received the information from Eddie Horvath that he had witnessed
drugs being smoked in the trailer and when the officers arrived
at the trailer residence. R. 60:17-8.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
There is no distinguishable characteristic between burnt and
burning marijuana that can be identified by odor alone.
of burnt marijuana, as decided by South,

The odor

does not alone qualify

as an exigent circumstance justifying the warrantless entry into
a personal residence. State v. South,

885 P.2d 795, 800 (Ut Ct.

App. 1994)(Reversed on other grounds).

An objective standard of

reasonableness cannot justify a finding that the Carbon County
Drug Task Force reasonably believed the faint odor they
recognized was that of burning marijuana.
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE ODOR OF BURNING MARIJUANA IS INDISTINGUISHABLE FROM THE
ODOR OF BURNT MARIJUANA.
First, a discussion of the issue identified by this court

requires an acknowledgment or a disavowal of the assertion that
the odor of burning marijuana is indistinguishable from that of
the odor burnt marijuana.

The State has not identified, nor can

it, a court or a case from any state or judicial body in our
unified states or federal government that has made this
distinction.1
Furthermore, in all of the cases identified by the State and
located by the Defendant that have considered the issue of
whether the smell of burnt or burning marijuana constitutes an
exigent circumstance to execute a warrantless search of an
individual residence, the courts have either used interchangeably
or without distinction, the phrases associated with the
description of the odor of burning and burnt marijuana.2

It is

obvious in this case as well, from the record below, that the
Carbon County Drug Task Force and the Utah Court of Appeals also
did not make a distinction between the odor of burnt and burning
marijuana.3
The State is asking this court to distinguish two types of
odor-"burning" vs. "burnt". Brief of Petitioner at 9 and 17.

The

trial court's findings of fact and the record from the hearing on
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Defendant's motion to suppress do not support this distinction.
R. 34:2; 60:19,43.
unreasonable.

Furthermore, the distinction is illogical and

The odor of smoke always lingers long after items

are burned and, contrary to the colloquialism, the odor of smoke
is not an accurate indicator of concurrent fire or burning.
It would be error for this Court to hold that the odor of
burning marijuana constitutes an exigent circumstance to the
warrant requirement when the facts in this case do not
substantiate a distinction between the two odors.

Officer Barnes

and Officer Anderson both testified that they only recognized the
odor of burnt marijuana. R. 60:19-20 and 43.

Nothing in the

record suggests that the officers smelled the odor of presently
burning marijuana or that they had the ability to distinguish the
difference.
Before this Court can reverse the Court of Appeal's 1994
decision in South,4

it must do so under the standard explained by

this Court in Mauchley.5
(Utah 2003).

Id.;

State

v.

Mauchley

67 P. 3d 477, 481

The State has not made this argument or met this

standard.

II.

THE ODOR OF BURNT MARIJUANA DOES NOT CREATE AN EXIGENT

CIRCUMSTANCE JUSTIFYING A LAW ENFORCEMENT'S WARRANTLESS ENTRY
INTO A PERSONAL RESIDENCE.
In 1994 the Utah Court of Appeals held, " . . . whereas the
Page 8 of
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smell of burnt marijuana provided the officers with probable
cause to obtain a search warrant authorizing a search of the
constitutionally protected home, it did not, alone, validate a
warrantless search." State

v.

South,

at 799.

In South,

an

officer investigating a possible cellular phone theft identified
what he described as the heavy odor of burnt marijuana coming
from inside a defendant's home and from the defendant's person.
Id.

at 797.

his home.
Id.

The officer asked the defendant if he could enter

The defendant refused to give the officer his consent.

The officer then obtained a search warrant for the defendant

and Dianna South and returned to the defendant's home with three
other officers who all smelled burnt marijuana emanating from
inside the home. Id.
v.

Id.

Dorson,

Despite these facts the court, citing

State

explained that,

[t]he police attempted to justify the seizure arguing
there were exigent circumstances because the officers
smelled marijuana coming from inside the house and
because drugs are easily hidden or disposed of. . . . to
establish exigent circumstances, the State must show that
the delay attendant upon the application for, and
issuance of, the warrant would likely have resulted in
the removal or destruction of evidence.
at 800; State
v. Dorson,
615 P.2d 740, 743-44, (Haw. 1980).

The Utah Court of Appeals in this case held that it fell within
the purview of South.

The officers recognized the faint odor of

burnt marijuana emanating from the home after arriving at a
minimum 41 minutes after a lay-witness reported what he believed
was the smoking of marijuana inside the residence.
Page 9 of

17

They made no

attempt to obtain a warrant or substantiate the lay witnesses
testimony.

They entered the residence because they believed: 1)

nobody in the residence had standing to contest the warrantless
entry; 2) obtaining a warrant was too much work and; 3) people in
the trailer were smoking up the evidence. R.60:19.
did have standing to contest the search. R.34.

The defendant

Law enforcement

had 41 minutes at a minimum to obtain a warrant. R.60:17-8
is no evidence in the record that they even tried.

There

The officers'

belief that the evidence was in the very process of being smoked
up was no more reasonable than the officers' belief in
State

v.

South

South.

(Ut. Ct. App. 1994).

The Defendant respectfully requests that the appellate
court's order below be affirmed.

III.

THE OFFICERS' BELIEF THAT EVIDENCE WAS IN THE PROCESS OF

BEING DESTROYED WAS UNREASONABLE.
It was not reasonable for the officers in this case to
believe that the marijuana odor they faintly identified when
approaching the trailer home was that of presently burning
marijuana.6

Contrary to the State's assertion, it cannot be

reasonably argued that the officers, upon their arrival at the
home, corroborated their suspicion that marijuana was still being
smoked. Petitioner's Brief at 7.

The Drug Task Force Officers

arrived at Lance Horvath's home at least 41 minutes after they
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learned of possible drug use.

It is particularly unreasonable to

assume that a person would be continuously smoking marijuana for
a least 41 minutes without further corroborating information.
After arriving, the officers did nothing to determine
whether marijuana was still being smoked.

The did not ask if the

lay-witness had recently re-entered the home.

They did not

attempt to make contact with the occupants of the trailer.

They

did not request that the informant attempt to re-enter the home
and investigate.

Instead the only corroborating information that

the officers obtained upon arrival was the faint odor of burnt
marijuana. R.60:19-20, 43.
As a Boy Scout home from summer camp can testify, the odor
of smoke lasts long after the fire is out.

It is objectively

unreasonable to conclude that the faint odor of burnt marijuana
together with a "41-minutes-old" report of drug use is evidence
that marijuana is still burning.
The Duran

opinion does not stand for the proposition that an

officer who observes and smells marijuana use cannot enter that
home and preclude that person from breaking the law and
destroying evidence. Petitioner's Brief at 16.

For the purposes

of this case, the Court of Appeals simply reaffirms that, whether
marijuana was burnt or is presently burning, can never be
accurately ascertained by odor alone.7
qualify as an exigent circumstance.

Page 11 of

17

Therefore, it cannot

CONCLUSION
Whether the detectable odor of burning marijuana

indicates

an exigent circumstance permitting a warrantless search of a
residence is an issue that was decided by the Utah Court of
Appeals in State

v.

South

on December 5, 1994. Id.

The State has

not requested that this precedent be overturned and the facts of
this case do not distinguish between burnt and burning.

A bare

allegation that marijuana was burning 41 minutes before the faint
odor of marijuana was identified, cannot create a reasonable
belief that marijuana is still burning.
Defendant respectfully requests that the Court of Appeals
decision below be affirmed.

Th i s -ftpgjAr

(

,

2006,

Samuet-S : r : ^^iley
Attorney for the Respondent
Endnotes:
1. Petitioner's brief contains the following case cites:
1) Board
of Educ.
v. Earls,
536 U.S. 822 (2002)(does not
mention or discuss the odor of burnt marijuana vs. the odor
of burning marijuana);
2) Illinois
v. McArthur,
531 U.S. 326 (2001) (does not mention or
discuss the odor of burnt marijuana vs. the odor of burning
marijuana);
3) Johnson
v. United
States,
333 U.S. 10 (1948) (does not mention
or discuss the odor of burnt marijuana vs. the odor of
burning marijuana);
4) Maryland
v. Buie,
494 U.S. 325 (1990) (does not mention or
Page 12 of
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5)

6)

7)

8)

9)
10)

11)

12)

13)

14)
15)

discuss the odor of burnt marijuana vs. the odor of burning
marijuana);
Mincey
v. Arizona,
437 U.S. 385 (1948)(does not mention or
discuss the odor of burnt marijuana vs. the odor of burning
marijuana);
Minnesota
v. Olson,
495 U.S. 91 (1990)(does not mention or
discuss the odor of burnt marijuana vs. the odor of burning
marijuana);
Payton
v. New York,
445 U.S. 573 (1980)(does not mention or
discuss the odor of burnt marijuana vs. the odor of burning
marijuana);
Schmerber
v. California,
384 U.S. 757 (1966)(does not mention
or discuss the odor of burnt marijuana vs. the odor of
burning marijuana);
Segura
v. United
States,
468 U.S. 796 (1984)(does not mention
or discuss the odor of burnt marijuana vs. the odor of
burning marijuana);
United
States
v. Karo,
468 U.S. 705 (1984)(does not mention
or discuss the odor of burnt marijuana vs. the odor of
burning marijuana) ;
United
States
v. Sokolow,
490 U.S. 1 (1989) (does not mention
or discuss the odor of burnt marijuana vs. the odor of
burning marijuana);
United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297
(1972)(does not mention or discuss the odor of burnt
marijuana vs. the odor of burning marijuana);
Welsh v. Wisconsin,
466 U.S. 740 (1984) (does not mention or
discuss the odor of burnt marijuana vs. the odor of burning
marijuana) ;
Consalvo
v. State,
372 So.2d 44 (1979)(does not mention or
discuss the odor of burnt marijuana vs. the odor of burning
marijuana);
Mendez
v. People,
372 P.2d 275 (Colo. 1999) (en banc) (The
Colorado Supreme Court does not distinguish between the odor
of burnt or burning marijuana. Although the Court refers to
the odor of burning marijuana throughout its opinion the
Colorado court relies wholly on State
v. Decker,
in which
the Arizona Supreme Court held that the odor of burned
marijuana constituted an exigent circumstance. Furthermore
the officer upon entering the motel room from which he could
smell burning marijuana did not find anyone who was in the
process of destroying marijuana. It is also important to
note that the Colorado Court place a heavy amount of weight
on the fact that the arresting officer did not go to the
motel with the purpose of investigating a drug crime and
therefore did not have the approximately 41 minutes to
obtain a warrant like the Carbon County Drug Task Force.
Since 1999, the date this case was decided it has not been
Page 13 of 17

16)

17)

18)

19)

20)

21)

22)

23)

24)

25)

followed or cited to by another Colorado case with similar
facts) ;
People
v. Mcllwain,
281 N.Y.S.2d 218 (N.Y. App. Div.
1967)(does not mention or discuss the odor of burnt
marijuana vs. the odor of burning marijuana);
State v. Ashe,
745 P.2d 1255 (Utah 1987)(does not mention or
discuss the odor of burnt marijuana vs. the odor of burning
marijuana);
State
v. Curl,
869 P.2d 224 (Idaho 1993) (The Idaho Supreme
Court does not distinguish between the odor of burnt or
burning marijuana. The officer upon entry into the room
further more found no corroborating evidence to assert that
people were in the act of burning marijuana. The Idaho
Supreme Court has held that the smell of burning
marijuana
does not constitute an exigent circumstance. State
v.
Manthei,
939 P.2d 556 (Idaho 1997)(reversed on other
grounds));
State
v. Decker,
580 P.2d 333 (Ariz. 1978) (The Supreme Court
of Arizona does not distinguish between the odor of burnt or
burning marijuana. Moreover the ourt uses the two terms
interchangeably. Like the Mendez, the officer arrived at
the motel room for a purpose other than investigation of
drug activity.);
State
v. Duran, 2005 UT App 409 (The Utah Court of appeals
does not distinguish between the odor of burnt or burning
marijuana. Moreover the court uses the two terms
interchangeably. ) ;
State
v. Heikkinen,
765 P.2d 1252 (Or. App. 1988) (does not
mention or discuss the odor of burnt marijuana vs. the odor
of burning marijuana.);
State
v. Hess, 680 N.W.2d 314 (S.D. 2004) (The facts of the
South Dakota did not involve the identification of the odor
of burning or burnt marijuana. The court does not mention
or discuss the odor of burnt marijuana vs. the odor of
burning marijuana.);
State
v. Kosman, 892 P.2d 207 (Ariz App. 1995) (The Arizona
Court of Appeals relying upon Decker,
does not distinguish
between the odor of burnt or burning marijuana. Decker,
580
P.2d 333.)) ;
State
v. Krukowskl,
100 P.3d 1222 (Utah 2004) (does not
mention or discuss the odor of burnt marijuana vs. the odor
of burning marijuana.);
State
v. Ramirez,
746 P.2d 344 (Wash. App. 1987) (The
Washington Court of Appeals does not distinguish between the
odor of burnt or burning marijuana. The officer upon entry
into the room further more found no corroborating evidence
to assert that people were in the act of burning marijuana.
The Washington Court held that the smell of
burning
Page 14 of
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marijuana does not constitute an exigent circumstance.)/'
26) State
v. South,
885 P.2d 795 (Utah App. 1994), (rev'd on
other grounds), 924 P.2d 354 (Utah 1996)(The Utah Court of
appeals does not distinguish between the odor of burnt or
burning marijuana. Moreover the court uses the two terms
interchangeably.);
27) State
v. Strange,
530 So.2d 1336 (Miss. 1988)(does not
mention or discuss the odor of burnt marijuana vs. the odor
of burning marijuana) .

2. The following are a list of cases that the Defendant was able
to locate that mention the issue of burned marijuana and
exigency:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
10)
11)
12)
13)
14)
15)
16)
17)

Cherry v. Commonwealth, 605 S .E.2d 297 (Va. Ct. App. 2004);
Mendez v. People, 372 P.2d 27 5 (Colo. 1999)
Rideout v. State, 122 P.3d 20 1 (Wyoming 2005);
State v. Akerman, 499 N.W.2d 882 (N.D. 1993);
State v. Carter, 636 P.2d 460 (Or. Ct. App 1981);
State v. Curl, 689 P.2d 224 ( Idaho 1993)
State v. Decker, 580 P.2d 333 (Ariz. 1978)
State v. Dorson, 615 P.2d 740 (Haw. 1980);
State v. Halpern, 30 P.3d 383 (N.M. Ct. App. 2 0 0 1 ) ;
State v. Hess, 680 N.W.2d 314 (S.D. 2004)
State v. Holland, 744 A.2d 65 6, 662 (N.J.Super.Ct. 1999);
State v. Kosman, 892 P.2d 207 (Ariz Ct. App. 1995)
State v. Pool, 652 P.2d 254, 256 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982);
State v. Ramirez, 746 P.2d 34 4 (Was. Ct. App 1987)
State v. Schwartz, 532 N.W.2d 470 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995);
State v. Shur, 538 P.2d 689 ( Kan. 1975);
State v. South, 885 P.2d 795 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)(rev'd on
other grounds)
18) State v. Steelman, 93 S.W.3d 102 (Tex. Crim. App. 2 0 0 2 ) ;
19) State v. Vanderveer, 667 A.2d 382 (N.J.Super.Ct. 1995);

3. The Carbon County Drug Task Force Officers at the suppression
hearing described the odor they recognized as a faint odor of
burnt marijuana while at the same one of the officers indicated
his belief that evidence was in the process of being burned up.
R.60:19 and 43. The Court of Appeals in Duran,
used the phrase
odor of burnt and burning marijuana interchangeably in its
opinion in its recitation of the observation of the officers and
the Utah Court of Appeals decision in South.
State
v. Duran,
2005
UT App 409, 3-5, 20-22; State v. South,
(Ut Ct. App. 1994).
4. Defendant is specifically referring to the South Court's
holding that, "the smell of marijuana provided the officers with
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probable cause to obtain a search warrant authorizing a search of
the constitutionally protected home it did not, alone, validate a
warrantless search." State v. South,
885 P.2d 795, 799 (Ut Ct.
App. 1994)(Reversed on other grounds).
5. In State
v. Mauchley,
the Utah Supreme Court held,
Those asking us to overturn prior precedent have a
substantial burden of persuasion due to the doctrine of
stare decisis. The doctrine of stare decisis is crucial
to
our
system
of
justice
because
it
ensures
predictability of the law and fairness of adjudication.
However, when we are clearly convinced that a rule was
originally erroneous or is no longer sound because of
changing conditions and that more good than harm will
come by departing form precedent, we are not inexorably
bound by our ow precedents.
State
v. Mauchely,
67 P.3d 477,481 (Utah 2003).
6. Officer Barnes Testified at the suppression hearing that after
arriving at the home approximately 41 minutes after receiving the
phone call from Eddie Horvath indicating that he had witnessed
what he believed was the illegal smoking of marijuana that
officers decided that marijuana was still being smoked. 60:19.
7. The State's oft repeated Duran, cite "Although the smell of
burning marijuana provided the officers probable cause that a
crime was being committed, it did not create exigent
circumstances that would permit a warrantless entry, is much more
clear when it is read in context of the preceding sentence and
paragraph. Duran, at 22.
The state argued that the smell of burning marijuana
alerted the officers to the fact that a crime was being
committed an that the evidence of that crime was being
destroyed. The South court disagreed,
The States concern that marijuana may be
hidden or disposed or before officers obtain a
warrant is outweighed by the concern that a
warrantless
search
would
violate
the
heightened expectation of privacy oi a private
home.
Thus we hold that although the plain
smell doctrine provides officers probable
cause to believe contraband or evidence of a
crime may be found, it does not automatically
provide officers with exigent circumstances
justifying a warrantless search of a private
residence.
Finding that the officers could have secured the home
while they obtained a warrant, the South court concluded
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that the search was unreasonable despite the odor of
burnt marijuana detected by Officer Simonson.
As in South, the warrantless search of Horvath's
trailer was not justified by the odor of burnt marijuana
detected by the officers when they approached the
trailer.
Although the smell of burning marijuana
provided the officers probable cause that a crime was
being committed, it did not create exigent circumstances
that would permit a warrantless entry.
Duran, at 21-2.
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IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

])

RULINGS ON MOTIONS
TO SUPPRESS

]

vs.

:

BERNADETTE DURAN,

])

Case No. 031700152

JESSICA JOYCE SCHMIDT,

])

Case No.

]1

Judge Bryce K. Bryner

Defendants.

031700154

A joint suppression hearing for each of the above defendants was held on December 12,
2003. At the conclusion of the hearing the court granted each of the parties time to submit
written memorandum and instructed the State tofilea Notice to Submit for Decision when the
matters were ripe for decision. A Notice to Submit wasfiledwith the court on March 3, 2004..
The court now issues its memorandum decision.
The State of Utah in its memorandum concedes that both defendants have standing to
challenge the search of the trailer on April 22, 2003. The court alsofindsfrom the evidence
presented at the suppression hearing that a warrant to enter and search the trailer was not
obtained.
The Fourth Amendment prohibits all unreasonable searches and seizures. The court must
therefore consider whether the warrantless search of the trailer occupied by the three defendants
was justified under any of the recognized exceptions to the requirement of first obtaining a search
warrant. Recognized exceptions include consent searches; searches incident to lawful arrest
based on probable cause under exigent circumstances; searches and seizures made in hot pursuit;

searches and seizures of contraband in areas lawfully accessible to the public; and seizure of
evidence in plain view after lawful intrusion. State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851 at 855 (Utah 1992).
Officer Rick Anderson testified that he was at Mrs. Horvath's home on April 22, 2003, when
she told Sergeant Barnes that there were people in the travel trailer next to her home doing drugs.
She showed the officers the title to the trailer and stated that she owned it. She then told the
officers that she wanted them to go in the trailer and remove the occupants because they were
doing drugs. Based on the written consent provided by Mrs. Horvath and detecting the odor of
burnt marijuana emanating from the trailer, the officers entered the trailer.
It is significant that at the time of obtaining the consent to search the trailer that no mention
was made to any of the officers by Mrs. Horvath that she was renting the trailer to her son,
defendant Lance Horvath, or that he was paying any rent. Although Lance testified at the
suppression hearing that he had occupied the trailer for ten years and that he was paying rent of
$100.00 per month, there is no evidence that this information was given to the officers by Mrs.
Horvath at the time the consent was obtained.
Although the court finds that Mrs. Horvath did not actually have "common authority" over
the trailer which would authorize her to consent to the search of the trailer, the court finds that
the officers reasonably believed that she had "common authority" over the premises when she
showed them the title and told them that she wanted them out. The court therefore finds that the
officers in good faith entered the trailer believing that they had legal consent to search.
In Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 110 S.Ct. 2793 (1990) the United States Supreme
Court ruled that common authority is defined through the eyes of the police at the time of entry.
The court therefore finds that in the instant case the warrantless entry as valid because it was
based upon the consent of Mrs. Horvath whom the officers reasonably believed possessed
common authority over the premises. Accordingly, the opening of the trailer door by Sergeant
Barnes was not improper, and the discovery of contraband in the trailer in the ensuing search is

not objectionable because it was pursuant to consent by someone who had apparent authority.
Having determined that consent to the search was granted, it is not necessary for the court to
reach the question of whether "exigent circumstances" existed.
The motions to suppress are denied.
DATED this 30th day of April, 2004.
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